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Is Law Computable?: Critical Perspectives on Law and Artificial Intelligence. Edited by Simon
Deakin and Christopher Markou. Oxford; New York: Hart Publishing, 2020. xxi, 320 pages.
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-1-5099-3706-6 (Hardback) $130.05.
If you have any interest in artificial intelligence (AI), especially if it’s coupled with a desire to
learn more about how developments in AI are related to law and legal technology, then this
collection of papers has been compiled just for you. However, as Frank Pasquale 1 rightly
suggests in his thoughtful foreword, this is also “a collection that should be read by a wide range
of audiences both in and around the legal profession” (p. v).
Why such high praise? First of all, these papers were prepared for a one-day workshop 2 that
brought together “some of the most influential scholars working at the intersection of
law/technology” (p. 19). This diverse range of experts gathered at the University of Cambridge
in December 2019 to share their ideas and talk about how artificial intelligence, machine
learning and data science have been and might be applied to legal procedures and decisionmaking. And secondly, as stated in the concluding remarks of the editors’ introductory chapter,
these papers are a “deliberate effort to push-back against the more hagiographical accounts of AI
in law” (p. 28). In other words, these papers provide a much-needed critical analysis and reality
check.
While AI is mentioned regularly in media and social media sources, the general fervor over AI
seems to have died down since IBM’s Watson won that fabled Jeopardy! tournament in 2011, or
DeepMind’s AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol the reigning 9-dan professional Go champion 4 games to 1
in 2016. Computational successes like these, or even the earlier Deep Blue chess program, have
led some Legal AI proponents to “mistakenly assume that because machine learning systems can
perform well in certain well-defined and well-delineated tasks, they are transferable … to a
complex, shifting thing like law, filled with loosely-defined abstract concepts” (p. 119).
The idea of the “legal singularity,” 3 which Jennifer Cobbe describes as “the point at which
machines become as good as if not better than humans at understanding, applying, and,
potentially, writing the law” (p. 107), is raised and contested by many of the writers in this
collection. Lyria Bennett Moses, for example, explains that law and legal processes are much
more of a “multi-dimensional puzzle” (p. 205) and therefore there will not be a “single
singularity” (p. 205-222). She also provides a particularly useful conceptualization describing
these legal singularities as a three-dimensional solid changing over time where “each axis
comprises legal tasks otherwise performed by human paralegals, lawyers and judges” (p. 205).
Think of an amorphous object that expands until all aspects of this legal puzzle have reached out
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to touch an encompassing sphere that represents the perfect or “functionally complete” 4 legal
system.
All contributions to this collection are well-written, impeccably researched, thought provoking
and worth reading. In addition to the application of AI to law in general there are papers that
focus more specifically on law and politics, law and society, the rule of law, holding AI
criminally responsible, copyright, and assessing mental capacity.
Having said that, if you could only read one of these chapters, the final chapter by Christopher
Markou and Lily Hands would be recommended. It provides an excellent overview of the
challenges involved when using AI as a way to assess legal capacity. It begins by considering the
influence of early applications of AI and medicine including the development of medical expert
systems used for psychiatric diagnosis and clinical decision support. In the process Markou and
Hands also review various stages in AI development: Logical AI, Connectionist AI, Affective
Computing, Automated Mental State Detection, and briefly touches on human brain interfaces.
Since machines are not “capable of cognitive awareness” (p. 195) they don’t, nor can they,
“think.” 5 Therefore the idea of using a machine to assess the psychological state of a human
being is an important legal problem to consider. Especially, as Markou and Hands explain, when
the assessment process calls on the courts “to apply a fundamentally imprecise concept to
subjective evidence while resolving conflicts between individual autonomy, social norms, ethics
and public policy” (p. 279). In other words, this is not a well-defined area of law.
The social role of law is often overlooked in legal AI which leads Cobbe to conclude that
“without rethinking how law is problematized and responses developed, and without working
towards radically rebuilding the law to try to produce a fairer, more just society, legal singularity
as a vision and a goal remain primarily concerned with making the law better at entrenching
market-oriented logics, commercial imperatives, and a particularly computational worldview” (p.
133). This omission is another common thread found throughout this collection and raises
another important question that many authors allude to: just because “arbitrary software
developers in big tech or big law” (p. 83) can apply AI to an area of law, or indeed to any aspect
of life, should they?
From a practical perspective these papers are enhanced by a glossary and a decent index. For
each term in the glossary, for example ‘Machine Ethics,’ a definition and a short reading list are
provided. Very helpful for readers looking to gain a better understanding of the concepts and
historical developments of AI and law. While AI continues to seep into many areas of legal
practice this is an important collection of critical papers relevant not just for law libraries but for
any library collection hoping to inform readers about ongoing developments of AI and society.
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“Even though machines that ‘think’ is how some people have conceptualized AI, this remains a futuristic vision”
(p. 207).
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